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ABSTRACT 
Like all EU countries, Spain should design and promote a fair and homogeneous 
generalized road pricing scheme. Tolls should vary according to infrastructure 
damage, degree of congestion, risk of accident, and environmental nuisances. An 
initial study (Spanish road pricing model project: META) of interurban transport pricing 
has been carried out at national level, considering the valuation of the internal and 
external costs to define efficient road pricing schemes of different type of roads and 
appropriate price levels in different interurban road contexts, shifting from a toll for 
financing infrastructure construction to a toll for recovering social costs. 
 
The META project has developed an easy-to-apply pricing methodology, based on a 
bottom-up approach. The main variable is the AADT -daily flow- applied to accurately 
estimate generalized road transport costs for each kind of vehicles and each type of 
road. Based on the current Spanish road network, the META model estimates all 
social costs: internal costs (fuel, vehicle maintenance, labor, insurance and tax) and 
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external costs (infrastructure, congestion, accident and environmental nuisances). 
Computed for the 13,156 Km of interurban highways network, the model  calculates 
the costs for each vehicle type (Car, HGV, LGV and bus) and for each road network 
section following the interurban road characteristics (AADT, capacity and traffic 
composition for each section of highway network).  
 
The two main results of META model for costs in terms of policy implications suggest 
to moderate the construction of new interurban road infrastructures in Spain and to 
analyze congestion before to built new metropolitan roads. If we decide for a road 
pricing scheme based on the environmental, accident and infrastructure costs, 
because of the reduced number of the congestion situation, we can use the average 
external costs that are very similar to the marginal external costs. 
 
Key words: Road costs estimation, External Costs, Internalization, Roads Pricing.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The European Commission has advocated the reform of transport pricing, so as to 
harmonize transport policies and make more efficient the transport system by making 
the market conditions more similar in the member countries. Since 1970, the EU has 
been trying to establish a pricing policy that is fair and acceptable for all countries 
(EC,1970). The European Commission’s Green Paper ―Towards Fair and Efficient 
Pricing in Transport‖ (EC,1996) launched a discussion on pricing transport according 
to the marginal cost and the recovery of fixed investment costs. The White Paper ―Fair 
Payment for Infrastructure Use‖ (EC, 1998) took this approach a step further, and 
presented a gradual path for implementing all transport modes, which was then 
adopted in the White Paper ―European Transport Policy 2010: Time to decide‖ (EC, 
2001). The main goal was to ensure that each transport mode pays for the costs its 
operation produces. Transport taxes and prices should vary according to 
infrastructure damage, degree of congestion, risk of accident, and environmental 
nuisances.  
 
In parallel, more regulation of transport pricing has been developed by EU directives. 
The 1999/62 EC directive allows member countries to introduce a distance related 
charge for using European highways to cover construction, maintenance, and 
exploitation costs.  This earlier directive was modified in 2006 by Directive 
2006/38/EC on the charging of HGVs for the use of certain kinds of infrastructure. 
This more recent Directive paved the way for the introduction of charges on vehicles 
and especially HGVs in the EU countries, based on the distances they travel and the 
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estimated resultant pollution. A new objective of this charge is to cover the costs of 
both pollution and congestion. But the necessary legal criteria to define how, and 
when, to collect the pollution charge have still not been formulated. As a 
consequence, the EU countries possess neither the necessary incentives, nor explicit 
conditions made clear, for implementing such a charge. Only the new directive project 
of 2008/0147/EC tries to define reliable methods for estimating pollution and 
congestion costs and to calculate the appropriate road charge for each kind of 
vehicle. In any case, the EU directives are guidelines which have to be implemented 
by each country in the way they prefer, following the ―subsidiarity principle‖ 
(Jaensirisak S., M. Wardman, and A.D. May, 2005). 
 
Some countries have already adopted a charge for highway use. For instance, 
according to a 1999/62 EU directive, Austria and Germany moved a few years ago to 
a distance-based charging approach for HGVs over 12 tons (Link, H., 2007). 
Recently, the Czech Republic also adopted an approach similar to that of Austria and 
Germany (Chlan, A., 2008). Switzerland, even though it is not a member of the EU, 
has been charging HGVs above 3.5 tons for use of Swiss roads on all their roads 
since 2001 (Balmer, U., 2004). 
 
Spain has 13,156 Km of interurban highways network (MIFO, 2007), of which only 
2,814 km of those highways are tolled sections. Like other EU countries, Spain is 
obliged to consider the European Union’s transport policy and regulations designed to 
define, and promote, a fair and homogeneous generalized road pricing scheme. An 
initial study (META) of interurban transport pricing has been carried out at the national 
level, where the major debate is about the relative efficiency of different road pricing 
instruments and what the appropriate price levels should be in different interurban 
road contexts (Saurí et al., 2010).  
 
The objective of this paper is to develop a methodology to evaluate the social costs 
including internal and external costs of traffic roads, where the internal costs contains 
time costs (without congestion cost) and operation costs (fuel consumption, lubricant 
etc.) and external cost includes infrastructure, CO2 cost, pollution cost, accident cost, 
congestion noise costs. We consider infrastructure maintenance costs like an 
external cost because currently are mainly paid by the government general 
expenditure, finally by the society. In this context, a model for road costs is 
implemented into the road network data to estimate the social costs in Spain. Based 
on the real daily flow data, the road social costs were estimated for a group of road 
section classified by a clustering process. All roads sections were classified firstly by 
the number of lanes and secondly by three different variables: average daily flow, 
proportion of HGV and floating vehicles speed (a proxy of the space speed). 
K-meaning method is used to cluster each type of highways (2+2, 3+3 and 4+4 lanes). 
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By this process we obtain, for each type of highways, two typical clustered road 
sections groups:  a standard highways group, and another group of ―intensive-use‖ 
highways. The implementation of the costs model to the height clustered groups of 
Spanish highways produces the estimation of the road costs for the selected road 
sections. Following this empirical costs model, the proposal for a toll scheme should 
include a price range for roads of 0.05€ per car-km to 0.14€ per HGV-km, defined like 
the difference between social and internal average costs. In this context, a toll 
scheme based on the marginal costs can be justified only in the metropolitan areas 
during peak hours.  
 
The paper is divided into six sections. The first section—after the 
introduction—provides an overview of the current state of research on road pricing. 
The second section presents the characteristics of the current situation in Spain 
vis-à-vis the road pricing scheme. The third section describes the scope and the 
methodology to estimate the social costs by defining a costs model and applying a 
cluster methodology to implement the cost model to the road networks. The fourth 
section presents an analysis of the results. The fifth section proposes a vehicles 
tolling scheme based on average or marginal social costs depending on road traffic 
situations. The sixth section draws conclusions about implications for road pricing 
policy as a result of the road costs estimation. 
 
STATE OF RESEARCH ON ROAD PRICING 
Using road pricing as a means of allocating resources to optimise social welfare when 
congestion and other externalities arise has been analyzed in the literature for a long 
time. In the book Economics of Welfare, Pigou (1920) introduced the possibility of 
setting up prices to internalise the externalities of a given activity. During the last few 
decades in the transport field this approach has been particularly focused on pricing 
congestion in urban areas based on marginal social costs (Nash, 2007). However, in 
recent years there has been a growing trend towards charging all kind of vehicles 
travelling on the interurban highways network considering all external and the 
infrastructure costs as a means of internalizing the externalities they produce 
(Jansson J.O. and G. Lindberg, 1998; Suter and Walker 2001; Parry and Small 2005; 
Calthrop et al. 2007). 
 
Since the publication of the Green paper on fair and efficient pricing (EC, 1996), the 
EC policy has postulated the ―user pays‖ principle for charging the use of transport 
infrastructure. Apart from the Green paper, the major policy documents to define and 
implement charging policy in the UE are the White paper of 1998 on the fair payment 
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for infrastructure use (EC, 1998), the White paper from 2001 on European Transport 
Policy (EC, 2001) as well as directives and charging proposals for the specific 
transport modes.  
 
The 1998 White paper defines the principle of social marginal cost pricing as the fair 
and efficient principle and suggests this as the leading principle for EU charging 
policy. In the subsequent policy documents such as the 2001 White paper, however, it 
is also recognised that there are situations where deviations from social marginal cost 
might be appropriate, provided that charges are non-discriminatory (for example in 
sectors where budget constraints arte binding and thus cost recovery needs to be 
achieved). The legislative process to implement these principles at a modal level has 
been slow. On the road sector, there are two relevant directives: First, the 
Eurovignette directive (1999/62/EC) and second, a modification of this directive (EC 
2006/38/EC). The 1999 Directive applies to vehicles above 12t max GVW and allows 
charging only on motorways whereby the charging principle is an average cost 
principle restricted to infrastructure costs (cost of construction, maintenance and 
operation). The 2006 Directive extends charging to the Transport European Networks 
and to roads which might be faced with diverging traffic. It applies to HGV above 3.5 t 
max GVW and allows to differentiate charges by distance, type of infrastructure, type 
of vehicle (axle weight, engine type, emission class etc.), speed, time of day as well 
as specific routes.   
 
In general, there are three groups of countries with different traditions and motives 
behind road user charging. The first group comprises countries which historically 
relied on toll collection to fund highways development. This group includes France, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain, and more recently Greece, Croatia and Slovenia. A second 
group form the so-called Vignette countries which have within an EC agreement 
introduced the so-called EuroVignette for HGV. To this group belong Austria (until 
2004), Germany (until 2005), Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Denmark and 
Sweden.  A third group of countries consists of Switzerland, Austria , Germany and 
recently the Czech Republic which have introduced distance-related HGV charges 
based on the relevant EU directives and, in the case of Switzerland as non-EU 
country, based on national policy goals and bilateral negotiations with the EU.  
 
Most road pricing schemes are differentiated by combinations of vehicle 
characteristics such as: 
1. number of axles and/or wheels (Austria, Germany), 
2. weight of the vehicle (Hungary, Czech Republic), 
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3. height of the vehicle (Croatia, France), 
4. length of vehicle (Netherlands), 
5. foreign or domestic registered cars (Serbia), 
6. emissions or fuel type (London), 
7. number of passengers (Norway E39  - additional charges). 
There are only few examples of charging schemes where charges directly vary by 
environmental criteria (emissions), by road condition (to support maintenance policy) 
or by level of service (except the fast lanes in U.S.). Notable exceptions are the use of 
discounts or exemptions for alternative fuelled vehicles (e.g. in the London 
Congestion Charge and the Pollution charge in Milan) or zero-emission engines (e.g. 
on express lanes in California). Environmental and pavement damage criteria may of 
course be addressed indirectly via the differentiation of charges according to vehicle 
classes.  
 
The majority of current road pricing schemes are far from real-time congestion 
charging. Some systems, mainly in cities, discriminate between peak and off-peak 
times, but mostly in larger time slots. Examples with two or three different charges 
depending on time-of-day or peak/off-peak are the Trondheim Ring Road (Norway), 
the Stockholm Congestion Charge and the Highways in Portugal. Higher charges at 
peak times are generally achieved by offering off-peak discounts rather than by 
explicitly setting higher charges during the peaks. In Portugal, off-peak discounts are 
only available to users of the ETC pass (―Via Verde‖). The systems which come 
closest to real-time congestion charging are the SR91 and IR15 express lanes in 
California and the road pricing scheme in Singapore. At the express lanes in 
California (State Road 91) the charges vary between weekdays and time of day 
(hourly) and the operator offers also different charges at public holidays. The aim of 
the pricing scheme is to provide a safe, reliable and predictable commute option with 
guaranteed speed. Drivers have the option of choosing ordinary, un-tolled lanes. The 
IR15 scheme, also in California, is even more advanced; here charges vary 
dynamically to reflect current levels of demand and are set at the lowest level 
commensurate with maintaining free flow traffic on the tolled lanes. Charges may 
move up or down several times an hour. Drivers are informed of the current charge as 
they approach the tolled lane and have the opportunity to continue their journey on the 
un-tolled lanes. 
 
In the Singapore electronic road pricing (ERP) scheme the road charges vary in 
half-hourly time slots. Graduated rates have been introduced for the first five minutes 
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of the subsequent time slot which is characterised by a higher toll rate. In contrast, if 
the subsequent period has a lower rate, the new rate is introduced for the last five 
minutes. This applies to cases where the change in the rate is at least $0.50, 
depending on vehicle type. For car drivers, the graduated rate applies where the 
change in rate is at least $1. Rates are fixed for approximately 2-3 months and are 
reviewed in the light of expected demand during the next period.  
 
Following the EU policy (Towards fair and efficient pricing in Transport, 1996) oriented 
to implement a tolling system based on social marginal costs, Spain is studying the 
implementation of an interurban road pricing scheme (Di Ciommo F., A. Monzón and 
A. Fernandez, 2010). A starting point is that prices should reflect the marginal social 
cost imposed on society from consumption of the good (v-km travelled). When car 
users decide to travel additional kilometres impose additional costs (Nash, 2007): 
 
 on themselves (operating and time costs) 
 on the infrastructure-provider (maintenance and operation costs)  
 on other users (delay and congestion cost)  
 on the rest of society (accident, climate change, pollution and noise).  
 
Costs to other users and to the rest of society are referred to as external costs. These 
costs, specially the congestion costs, in general, are higher in the Metropolitan Areas. 
In fact, the estimation costs for the interurban road network in Spain shows that the 
marginal social costs are constant and similar to the average social costs. In 
consequence, in this case appear more appropriate and easier to propose a road 
pricing scheme based on the average external costs (Fang J., F. Di Ciommo, A. 
Monzón et al. 2009). 
  
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SPAIN.  
The present pricing system for Spanish highways is quite fragmented. Some highway 
construction is financed by tolls on users through concession contracts, other 
highway construction is financed by shadow tolls, that is tolls paid not by the 
immediate user, but paid to the concessionaire by the government as part of its 
general expenditures. The regions of Madrid and Murcia have been the first ones 
where the public administrations have applied shadow toll schemes as a way to 
remunerate the highway concessionaires.  Previously, the Central Administration did 
not employ the device of the shadow toll, fearing a possible risk of increase in its 
general budget spending (Vassallo, J.M. and R. Izquierdo, 2002). But new laws on the 
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concessionaire system introduce the possibility of using the shadow toll to finance 
road infrastructures (Vassallo, J.M. and A. Sanchez-Soliño, 2007). Related to this 
new regulatory perspective, more than 1,500 km of new regional and national 
highways will be financed by a shadow toll scheme. The Central Government is using 
this shadow toll scheme at present to finance the concessions contracts for the 
maintenance, renovation, and operations of the national highway network. At present, 
the highways where the direct toll is used amount to 2,814 km, while those that 
employ the shadow toll method of compensating concessionaires amount to 872 km. 
There is a plan to increase the highways relying on the shadow toll method to 
2,275.15 km, possibly by the year 2010, according to the plans of the Department of  
Spanish Infrastructures (MIFO, 2007a). The highways with a direct toll will then 
account for 60% of the total kilometers under concession and shadow toll schemes 
will be 40%. The direct toll range is between 0.06€/vkm and 0.16€/vkm and the 
shadow toll range between 0.05€/vkm and 0.09€/vkm (MIFO, 2007b). 
 
Growing the private and the freight road transport, traffic congestion, noise and 
environmental problems become more and more serious problems. The society is 
assuming directly the environmental and accident costs and indirectly the 
infrastructure costs mainly paid by the public general expenditure. In economics this 
costs are included among the social costs, which are defined as the sum of internal 
and external costs. The internal costs that include mainly time and operation costs, 
are paid immediately by road users, and external costs that contain maintenance of 
infrastructure, accident, CO2 emissions and noise costs, are a burden on society. 
 
Evaluation of internal and external cost is an essential and effective access to make 
charging on road users. Economic theory suggests social marginal cost pricing as the 
optimal pricing principle for charging the use of transport infrastructure. Therefore we 
define and implement a costs model to indicate the more adequate base for a road 
pricing scheme in Spain. 
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY TO ESTIMATE SOCIAL 
COSTS 
A model for a road social costs estimation 
This paper tries to implement a methodology to estimate the social cost of Spanish 
road systems. The methodology includes the classification of road sections’ by 
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clustering. The conclusions are focused on a proposal of road pricing scheme in 
Spain. 
 
Marginal costs can be the principle in the case of congestion conditions (Inge et al. 
1996). Therefore, the role of average cost in road pricing policy should be considered 
as well especially in the cases when a road pricing scheme is oriented more for 
recovering the construction and maintenance of infrastructure than for managing road 
traffic demand. The aim of cost model is to estimate the external costs produced by 
the road users and to assign them with a cost equivalent charge. Consequently, it is 
necessary to consider a formulation that allows assessing the total, average, and 
marginal costs in order to establish the most adequate toll to internalize the 
externalities produced by road traffic. The applied methodology defines the total cost 
function (CT), which is expressed depending on the hourly traffic flow. Initially, 4 
different vehicle categories were considered (a standard private vehicle with a 2 liter 
engine I1 , an 18-ton bus for passenger transportation I2,  an 18-20 ton rigid truck, I3, 
and articulated heavy vehicle for freight transportation, I4,). The final expression for 
the total costs in euros per vehicle-km is given by: 
4321 ,,, IIIICC TT         
(1) 
The external costs derived from road traffic can be classified according to their nature 
as costs, environmental costs (noise, climate change, pollution), costs of accidents 
and, in some cases, infrastructure (CE Delft, 2008). The final road traffic social cost 
function is an additive function of these costs: 
 
 TATENVTIcongTOT
CCCCCC
     (2) 
 
TOC  Operation costs (fuel consumption and travel time) 
congC  Congestion cost: travel time cost during congestion  
TIC   Maintenance and operation costs for infrastructure 
TENVC  Environmental costs (CO2, atmospheric pollution and noise costs) 
TAC   Costs of accidents 
 
Where the marginal external cost, for each kind of vehicle, is obtained deriving the 
total external costs function. 
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(3) 
In this paper we will analyse mainly the external costs, that are the basis for an 
European road pricing system.  
 
After identifying the different types of road traffic costs, the next step will be to develop 
individually the formulation of each type of external cost.  The congestion cost is 
formulated like a time operation cost where the marginal time cost is strongly 
increasing and higher that the average time cost.  
Infrastructure Costs 
The infrastructures’ construction costs are not taken into account in this study 
because we have considered a complete and already implemented network. This is 
why the flow of any additional vehicle in the network would not mean a short-term 
aggravation of these costs. Instead, we have considered the operation and 
maintenance costs, which depend on the traffic flow. 
 
To simplify, we only assess the maintenance costs related with wear and tear of road 
pavement, which involve the biggest expenditure for the infrastructure operators. 
Concretely, we have the formulation proposed by Small, Winston and Evans (19): 
 
 
rT
TI eKC 0  
 
(4) 
 
Where Ko is a constant determining the maximum cost of conservation, r is the 
discount rate and T represents the interval of time between maintenance operations.  
T is specifically determined by means of the following equation: 
 
 AVRMVPA
IMDIMD
Q
T
/)1(
)(
         (5)
 
 
Thus, the parameter T depends on the road capacity and the Average Annual Daily 
Traffic of light and heavy goods vehicles. Variable θ stands for values between 0 and 
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1, 0 being the most unfavorable situation. Finally, ε is a weighting parameter related 
with the heavy vehicle axle weight. 
For each average cost except maintenance cost depends on hourly flow, while 
maintenance cost is upon daily flow. The daily flow is a parameter in the maintenance 
cost equation. Also there is an assumption that the presence of cars brings no extra 
maintenance cost. They can be ignored in comparison to the cost produced by other 
vehicles (Bus, LGV and HGV).  
 
 Environmental Costs 
Environmental costs can be classified into three categories. First, the cost related to 
CO2 emissions, mainly responsible for the greenhouse effect, is considered. This 
cost is related to fuel consumption. In order to quantify them, the formulation 
proposed by Friedrich and Bickel has been considered, since it allows obtaining the 
cost of climate change in €/h. 
 
 
4
1
22,. )(.
i
i
iiiCOCOEnv vCcICC  
(6) 
Where Ii,is the flow time of vehicle type i; Cci(vi) is the fuel consumption depending on 
the speed of vehicle i; CCO2 is CO2 emissions cost ; and K is a constant representing 
the relation between emissions and consumption. 
The next cost to be taken into account regarding environmental costs is the cost 
related to the noise caused by vehicles. The noise is related to the vehicle flow by a 
logarithmic function, as considered in Weinberger (1991): 
 
 
))*1(*log(*10 pbQaLeq  
(7) 
Where Leq is the equivalent noise level, a and b are specific constants in road 
transportation, q is the overall vehicle flow in the stretch studied and p is the 
distribution of heavy vehicles regarding the total flow. This formula enables 
determining the cost associated with this phenomenon by considering the medical 
costs, since they vary depending on the equivalent noise level. However, because of 
the logarithmic nature of expression (Baumol, W.J. and W.E. Oates, 1988), a 
meaningful decrease in vehicle flow has no effect on the equivalent noise level, the 
variability of noise cost estimated is quite limited between 0.007-0.31 in urban 
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environment and 0.01 and 0.02 in the interurban environment, similar to the noise 
costs estimations realized in some others studies (CE Delft et al 2007; Infras 2004; 
Unite 2003) estimated between 0.008-0.034 €/veh-km in urban environment and 0 in 
the interurban environment.  
 
Finally, atmospheric pollution costs in euros per vehicle-mile derived from particle 
emissions are considered as well. The atmospheric pollution cost depends on the 
population (Pt); the average value φ of the PM10 immissions (particles below 10 
microns); the amount of new cases per million inhabitants from the new effects j (j = 
1,…,8), which are considered to be the consequence of a PM10 level of 10 μg/m3 a 
year (ni); and the cost on human health 1 each of these effects carry along, according 
to the following expression: 
10
P 
CT 1
t
,
m
i
ii
pEnv
cn
 
 
(8) 
  
(17) 
 
Accident Costs 
External costs caused by road accidents have been considered as regards the slightly 
injured, seriously injured and killed in an accident ratio (rsl, rse, rk), and as regards the 
value associated with each type of casualty. Thus, the expression formulating the 
costs derived from road accidents becomes linear as regards vehicle flow: 
 
)VRRVRRVR(RI CT mmhghghlhliacc  
(9) 
 
Where Ii represents the traffic flow in vehicle i, r is the risk associate to the different 
types of accident victims and V the monetary value associated to those types of 
victims. 
 
The major external costs depend on the fuel consumption and time cost. Both are 
related with the speed, using the relationship between speed and hourly flow 
(Transportation Research Board, 2000), knowing the AADT data, we can estimate the 
most important variable costs. 
 
2
2
1
0
.
Va
V
a
a
Km
FuelCons
       
(10) 
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The parameters 0
a
, 1a , 2a  are estimated for each type of vehicle following their 
technical characteristics. 
  
From the traffic fundamental equation between traffic volume and density (11) as 
well as the parabolic relationship between traffic volume and speed, we obtain (12). 
                          
vDIh                                (11) 
Therein Ih is the average hourly volume per lane (veh/h/lane), D is the traffic 
density (veh/km/lane) and v is the average travel speed (km/h). Therefore, v could be 
expressed as a function of Ih: 
            
0,5
maxmaxh
2
maxmax )]Dv*I*(4-[v*0,5v*0,5v           (12) 
Therein vmax is the maximum travel speed (km/h) and Dmax is the traffic maximum 
density (veh/km/lane).  
In this way, if we estimate the hourly flow, by equation 12, we can estimate the fuel 
consumption for each vehicle, and consequently mainly operation and external costs. 
 
        /Ih dkAADT       (13) 
 
Where: ·  
 the parameter "k" is IMD's proportion that is realized in rush hour,  
 the parameter "d" is IMD's proportion in rush hour and sense top, and  
 the parameter ―η‖ is the number of total lanes. 
Basically, each cost term depends on vehicle hourly volume Ihi that we can calculate 
by the daily flow that is a known variable by the data map elaborated by the Spanish 
Ministry of Public Works. 
The Cluster Analysis of Spanish Road Network 
The Spanish interurban road network has been represented using Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS). We have generated a digital network that covers the 
whole Iberian Peninsula and the French regions bordering Spain, to include also the 
border effects (Gutierrez, J., A. Condeço and J.C. Martín, 2010). This network 
contains all the roads managed by the Spanish Ministry of Public Works and the main 
roads belonging to the Regional governments as well.  
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Figure 1: Spanish Interurban Highways network ( META 2008) 
 
In Portugal and the French regions this graph includes the main roads. The final result 
is a dense network with more than 6,355 links covering a wide territorial area. This 
study focuses on interurban roads, the interest is to implement the model of social 
costs to estimate the cost-type of each road section of the network. We decide to 
classify the different roads by using a clustering process. For every road type, 
external cost is different even if sections’ traffic volume is the same, and it has 
different capacity and number of lanes, which are parameters in the cost model. The 
first step is to divide road types according to the number of lanes. Three attributes 
including POFi (Proportion of i section’s flow in maximal flow), POHi (Proportion of i 
section’s flow of HGV in total flow) and floating vehicles speed (a proxy of space 
speed) are chosen to cluster each road type. For every clustering there are a maximal 
density and speed which are defined in equations (10)-(13) respectively. Here those 
three attributes can be regarded as three vectors of each section. A clustering 
process means to measure the distance between every section and regroup the most 
nearest sections to the same cluster. 
 
Taking sections from 2+2-highways as an example, Figure 2-a shows the space 
location of those sections according the three attributes, Figure 2-b is the projective 
graphs of figure 2-a: the distribution of those sections from 2*2 lanes is concentrative, 
like the POF range from 0% to 20%, the range of POH is from 10% to 30% and the 
range for space speed is 100km/h to 130km/h. 
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Figure 2-a space location -2+2 highways 
 
 
 
Figure 2-b Projective location -2+2 -highways 
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Through this methodology we have been able to organize the road section into groups 
with comparable characteristics according to different criteria, traffic flow, percentage 
of heavy vehicles and floating vehicle speed, which determine the traffic costs. 
 
The most important result derived from using the cluster analysis is the choice 
between two different groups of road sections for each level of the road network: 
 
 Standard highways sections group: representative of the specific 
characteristics of most sections of the type of roads under consideration; 
 Intensive-Use highways sections group: contains the sections 
characterized by special traffic conditions (e.g. strong percentage of heavy 
vehicles, congestion) 
 
These groups will be used as a reference for estimating the cost-type of each 
representative section and establishing the corresponding toll values. 
 
Table 1:  Classification of standard and intensive-use highways  
 Standard and intensive-use road sections groups for 4-lane- 2+2-highway-    
Groups POFa (%) ADDTb (veh/day) PO hc (%) sd (km/h) sections (n) 
Standard (0-10) (0-30,000) (10-20) (100-130) 347 
Intensive-use (strong 
percentage of HGV) 
(0-10) (0-30,000) (30-50) (100-130) 181 
      
Standard and intensive-use road sections groups for 6- lane- 3+3-highway-    
Groups POFa (%) ADDTb (veh/day) PO hc (%) sd (km/h) sections (n) 
Standard  (10-30) (30,000-90,000) (0-30) (100-130) 110 
Intensive-use (congestion) (30-50) (90,000-150,000) (10-20) (80-110) 3 
      
Standard and intensive-use road sections groups for 8-lane- 4+4-highways    
Groups POFa (%) ADDTb (veh/day) PO hc (%) sd (km/h) sections (n) 
Standard  (10-30) (30,000-90,000) (10-30) (90-120) 21 
Intensive-use (congestion) (30-40) (90,000-120,000) (10-20) (40-90) 5 
 
Note:a.POF=[AADT/Max AADT]*100%,Proportion of Flow; b AADT is Annually Average Daily Flow; 
c.POH=[Flow of HGV/(AADT)]*100%, Proportion of HGV; d. SS is space speed(km/h). 
Road transport Social Costs in Spain: a new rationale for pricing policy 
DI CIOMMO, Floridea; MONZON Andrés; COMENDADOR Julio  
 
12
th
 WCTR, July 11-15, 2010 – Lisbon, Portugal 
 
17 
 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Applying the model described above to Spanish road data, average and marginal 
social costs of four types of vehicles are calculated. We present 2+2 highways as an 
example because they are more representative of the specific characteristics of the 
type of roads under consideration (90% of whole Spanish road network). The analysis 
and the discussion of the social costs are focused on the light (cars) and heavy 
vehicles (trucks and buses flow costs are very similar).    
 
Figure 3 and 4 show the average social costs estimated for cars and HGV for both 
road sections groups of 2+2 highways: standard and intensive-use. As shown above 
in the presentation of the costs model, social costs include internal (time and 
operation costs) and external costs (accidents, CO2 emissions, pollution and noise 
costs). The cost of time is a measure of the congestion cost, equivalent to the time lost 
due to the decrease in speed for all vehicles because of the incorporation of new 
users. In the representative clustering the average time cost is constant (free flow 
speed), while in the intensive-use road sections group it is higher and increasing with 
the growing flow because of the stronger proportion of HGVs (Fig. 3 and 4). In 
particular, in the case of heavy vehicles, the increasing flow produces an increasing 
time cost and, at the same time, decreasing fuel costs. The final result, in terms of 
internal costs, depends on the sum of changes in time and fuel costs. Hence, roads 
with a larger proportion of HGVs may more easily fall into congestion.  
 
We find this same kind of behaviour for the costs for cars in the case of 4+4-highways 
that represents the road sections closed to the metropolitan area where the proportion 
of car traffic is stronger and the congestion point easily reachable (Fig. 5). It is 
noticeable that operation costs mainly based on the fuel consumption are basically 
proportional to the speed until the congestion situation is reached. In fact, an 
increasing flow produces a decreasing average speed and a diminishing fuel cost. 
Average CO2 and accident costs are constant in no congestion situations and directly 
related with the speed.   
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Figure 3 average cost of CAR from standard and special sections of road selected -2+2 highways 
 
 Figure 4 average cost of HGV from standard and special sections of roads selected -2+2 highways 
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Figure 5 average cost of CAR from standard sections of road selected -4+4 highways 
 
The average noise  and  pollution costs are the same for all kinds of vehicles, since 
our cost function does not permit to precisely attribute the noise produced to a 
specific kind of vehicle. We can differentiate the noise for a given  proportion of 
heavy vehicles. Therefore, an important difference exists between the noise costs 
registered for the 2+2 standard highways and for the 2+2 intentive-use highways 
where a higher level of HGV is used for noise cost estimation. Actually, the trend of 
the cost of noise is more irregular for the intensive-use road sections group; in 
Road transport Social Costs in Spain: a new rationale for pricing policy 
DI CIOMMO, Floridea; MONZON Andrés; COMENDADOR Julio  
 
12
th
 WCTR, July 11-15, 2010 – Lisbon, Portugal 
 
19 
general, the noise cost is higher with a stronger HGV traffic flow.  An interesting 
result derives from estimating the noise and CO2 costs for 4+4 intensive-use 
highways: in this case, where the traffic is composed mainly by cars with a low 
porcentage of HGV, the noise costs are lower and rapidly decreasing.  
 
 
Figure 6 noise and pollution costs of vehicles from standard and special sections of roads selected -2+2 
highways. 
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Figure 7 noise and pollution costs of vehicles from intensive-use sections of roads selected - 4+4 
highways. 
 
The difference between the average internal cost and the average social cost 
represents the external costs which are a burden on society. Figure 8 shows the 
average internal and social costs of cars. The social costs are constant as the flow of 
traffic grows. In a situation of ―no congestion‖, the gap between the average social 
and internal costs represents the cost which road users should pay.  
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Figure 8: Comparaing social and internal costs for Car and HGV on 2+2 highways. 
 
 
A social costs comparison  
 
Comparing the results presented in table 2 on the social costs of cars, we can draw 
interesting conclusions about the current road social costs and their policy 
implications.  
 
First, the internal operation costs for the car are lower that the external costs. That 
means that the costs produced by a car and paid by society are bigger than the 
current costs paid by a private road user. This result is related to the low congestion 
rate of the interurban network, i.e. the high average speed that produces an 
important saving of travel time. In this case, the saving produced in travel time is 
bigger than the higher rate of fuel consumption related to a higher speed. Hence, the 
user has a small incentive to modify his behavior faced with the utilization of the car, 
while the society pays the bigger burden of the social cost. If we remind that the 2+2 
standard highways represent 90% of the whole Spanish road network, the implication 
of these sharing of the social costs between private user and society is relevant. A 
road pricing aiming the internalization of the external costs has a very good reason to 
exist. 
 
If we compare these results with the 4+4- intensive use case, the internal operation 
costs increases because of the increasing travel time, but the external costs are 
lower because of the lower consumption of fuel and the increased traffic flow. In this 
situation, the roads are working near to the point of constant economies of scale and 
the social optimal is financially viable.     
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Table 2: Average costs for car use 
Type of Highways   Operation 
costs (time and 
fuel) (€/v-km) 
External Costs (Co2, 
pollution, noise, accident 
(€/v-km) 
Social costs 
2+2-standard  0.08  0.12 
 
0.20  
2+2-intensive use  0.198 0.11 0.31 
3+3-standard    0.20  0.08 0.28 
3+3-intensive use  0.20 0.075 0.275 
4+4-standard  0.20 0.06 0.26 
4+4-intensive use  0.20 0.056 0.256 
 
 
In the case of the HGV (table 3) the road system is always operating with economies 
of scale that remain constant. The share of the social costs attributed to internal and 
to external and infrastructural costs is inverted in respect of the case of car in 2+2 
standard highways: the internal operation costs are always higher than the external 
and infrastructure costs. Obviously, the costs of infrastructure maintenance are 
higher in the case of 2+2 ―intensive-use‖ highways where the proportion of HGV 
traffic is stronger. In the case of HGV the implementation of a road pricing scheme 
will be useful to pay the use for the highways and to indemnify the society for the 
damage produced by the external costs, but not specifically to incentive HGV road 
users to change their travel behavior.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Road transport Social Costs in Spain: a new rationale for pricing policy 
DI CIOMMO, Floridea; MONZON Andrés; COMENDADOR Julio  
 
12
th
 WCTR, July 11-15, 2010 – Lisbon, Portugal 
 
22 
Table 3: Average costs for HGV 
Type of Highways  Maintenance 
infrastructure 
costs (€/v-km)   
 Operation 
costs (time and 
fuel) (€/v-km) 
External Costs 
(Co2, pollution, 
noise, accident 
(€/v-km) 
Social costs 
2+2-standard  0.021 0.71 0.138 0.869 
2+2-intensive use  0.023 0.73 0.108 0.861 
3+3-standard   0.015 0.85 0.12 0.985 
3+3-intensive use  0.003 0.59 0.096 0.689 
4+4-standard   0.033 0.89 0.083 1.006 
4+4-intensive use  0.011 
 
0.82 0.10 0.93 
 
META: A ROAD PRICING MODEL PROPOSAL 
The Spanish road pricing model project (META) proposes a vehicles tolling scheme 
aimed at recovering the cost for highway maintenance and operations as well as 
external costs. The META road pricing scheme proposed for the Spanish interurban 
road network is based on average costs calculated for each vehicle type (Car HGV, 
LGV and bus) following the interurban road characteristics (AADT, capacity and traffic 
composition for each section). As showed in Figure 1, for the Spanish interurban 
highways, mostly characterized as 4-lane - 2 plus 2- highways, congestion is not a 
current problem.  Therefore the marginal external cost is equal to the average 
external costs or even stays below the average external costs. In other words, the 
Spanish interurban roads, outside of the major metropolitan areas, are underused. 
That means that the road system is operating with increasing economies of scale (the 
system will be more efficient if more cars use the Spanish road network). 
 
To cover the external costs produced by a car user it is necessary to fix the toll so that 
it equals the average external costs. The case is slightly different when there is a 
comparison between marginal external and infrastructural cost and average external 
and infrastructural cost for the HGV, and where both costs are the same. This means 
that in the case of the HGV, the road system is operating with economies of scale that 
remain constant, the social optimal is financially viable, while the correct solution to 
determining tolls for private cars will be imperfect  because the condition of economic 
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efficiency -- with a toll equal to the marginal external cost is not attainable In fact, the 
system is unable to finance itself: somebody has to pay to cover the difference 
between average external costs and marginal external costs (Jara-Diaz, 2007). Two 
alternatives: the private car users pay a toll equal to the average external costs or the 
society as a whole decides to pay a part of the external costs (Fang, J., F. Di Ciommo, 
A. Monzon, 2009). 
 
FIGURE1. Marginal and average external road transport costs comparison in 2+2- highway  
 
Following this empirical model for costs, the proposal for a toll scheme should include 
a price range for roads (2+2 - highways) of 0.09€ per car-km to 0.14€ per HGV-km.  
It is said that the marginal cost should be the road pricing principle. It is clearly the 
best in the congested situation. However the Spanish road situation is not so bad 
according to our analysis. Marginal cost is not so important and average cost would 
be more attractive, average cost will be higher than marginal cost in low congestion 
situations, which will be more consistent with real situation. In consequence, we 
conclude that the average cost can be used instead of marginal cost to define a road 
pricing policy. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The research carried out shows clearly that marginal cost principle is not suitable for 
all situations. Average costs should also be applied to have a more accurate 
reference for road pricing determination. Any kind of social cost of HGV, LGV and 
BUS are bigger than those related to cars because of the maintenance costs and the 
higher operation costs.  
 
In this paper we analyze the current situation of the Spanish interurban road network 
and we estimate the social costs produced by different road users (basically cars and 
HGV). The main result is that 90% of the Spanish interurban highways network does 
not suffer a congestion problem. Two main consequences derive from this situation: 
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1. The basis of road pricing has not to be necessarily the marginal social costs. 
We can use average social costs because the marginal and average costs 
are constant and similar; 
2. 70% of the whole interurban highways network is underused. In the case of 
the 2+2 standard highways type, we face a very surprising result: the internal 
cost is lower than the external cost produced by a car. This implies that the 
car users have not the price incentive to correctly use the road. They need to 
pay for the external costs to perceive the cost nearest to the real cost 
produced by a trip. 
3. The composition of the internal costs between fuel and time changes, 
following the floating vehicle speed (table 2): when the traffic flow is very low, 
the consumption of fuel is higher, but the travel time cost is very low. With an 
increasing traffic flow the situation is inverted, but the internal cost is the 
same, except for the car in the case of 2+2 standard highways. 
 
Concerning HGV traffic, the cost of maintenance infrastructure is higher for 2+2 
intensive-use highways, while the internal costs increases with an increasing traffic 
flow because of the higher travel time costs. In the context of 2+2 standard highways, 
car users have very little incentive to modify their behavior, while the society is 
charged by the bigger burden of the social cost. If we recall that the 2+2 standard 
highways represent 70% of whole Spanish road network, the implication of this 
sharing of the social costs between the private user and society is relevant. A road 
pricing aiming at the internalization of the external costs has a very good reason to 
exist. Within the European Union framework, this is a very relevant result that should 
reinforce the purpose to apply a generalized road pricing scheme to all types of 
vehicles, including private cars.  
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